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There may be no state interest more compelling than theindependence, impartiality, and integrity of the judi-ciary.1 There may also be no public office for which indi-
vidual accountability is so critical, not only because judges
often have the last word in our society’s disputes, but because
public confidence in the courts is fundamental to the rule of
law around which our society is organized. Trust in the
administration of justice depends not only on the merits of
the verdicts rendered in the courtroom but on the probity and
the appearance of probity among those who decree them. A
litigant may not feel happy about losing a case, but no one
should walk out of a proceeding reasonably believing that the
process was tainted by an arbiter who was biased, improperly
influenced, or otherwise unfair. 
By the early twentieth century, some states had individually
attempted to address the delicate balance between judicial
independence and accountability, typically by drafting rudi-
mentary standards of ethical conduct to which judges could
aspire.2 The American Bar Association then took up the issue
and in 1924 issued Canons of Judicial Ethics, which attempted
to harmonize the judicial responsibility to decide cases free
from outside influence with the judge’s obligation to behave on
and off the bench in a manner that enhances respect for the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.3
Throughout the United States, while the 1924 ABA code
offered commendable aspirational guidance to the bench,
enforcement was either entirely lacking or left to the courts
themselves. Not surprisingly, judges were not especially ener-
getic about enforcing rules of conduct on one another.4 Nor
was the alternative remedy of impeachment apt to be initiated
by a legislature.5
It was not until 1960 that a state adopted a method of judi-
cial ethics enforcement that was not controlled by the judi-
ciary itself.6 The California Commission on Judicial Perfor-
mance was created to investigate and, where appropriate,
impose public discipline on judges who were found to have
violated promulgated rules of judicial ethics.7 As other states
followed suit and there was talk of implementing ethics over-
sight in the federal courts, associations representing judges
and some newspapers expressed concerns that judicial con-
duct commissions would chill judicial independence.8 Far less
frequently appreciated was the degree to which a judicial con-
duct commission could protect and promote the indepen-
dence of the judiciary. Now, nearly 60 years after the advent of
the first one, independent ethics entities have not only
become part of the judicial landscape in the states, they have
indeed safeguarded judicial independence as surely as they
have redressed judicial misconduct. 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
Although the judiciary article of the United States Constitu-
tion9 is far shorter than the legislative and executive articles
that together established our tripartite system of government,
its role and impact are outsized. From the founding of the
American republic, an independent and impartial judiciary has
not only been the indispensable anchor of our tripartite system
of government, it has been an immeasurable protector of our
most basic rights and liberties, such as ensuring the right to
counsel, the right against self-incrimination, the right to a fair
trial, the right to free expression, and the right to worship. This
may subject judges to unfair and certainly unwanted criticism.
A prosecutor may denounce the release of a defendant on rec-
ognizance. A public defender may decry the imposition of the
maximum sentence against a convicted felon. An editorial may
take issue with an appellate court’s legal reasoning. A public
official may claim bias because of a judge’s political pedigree or
ethnic ancestry.
Whatever pressure or public clamor may be brought to bear,
the judge’s job is to act at all times, on and off the bench, in a
manner that upholds and promotes public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. 
Why are judicial probity and fairness so significant?
Because public confidence in the administration of justice is
what keeps people coming back to the courts and what
empowers the writ of our law. The judicial branch may be the
most subtle and least understood of the three, but its indepen-
dence, integrity, and impartiality are at the heart of what
George Washington identified as the “due administration of
justice” that is the “firmest pillar of good government.”10 And
as Alexander Hamilton explicated in The Federalist in 1787-
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88,11 and history has repeatedly underscored, the judiciary
owes its power not to an army to enforce its will, nor to the
public purse to fund its mandates, but to the integrity of its
judgments. It is confidence in that integrity, and in the princi-
ple that the litigant will get a fair shake from an impartial mag-
istrate, a fair-minded jury, and an unbiased appellate reviewer,
that keeps citizens coming to the courts rather than turning to
the streets to resolve disputes.
Time and again, from the earliest days of our civil society to
the present, the courts have stood up to the potential tyranny of
the mob and government. Not always, of course. Judges and
juries are fallible human beings. Try as they might to get it right,
sometimes they get it wrong. As every trial judge knows and
occasionally jokes, that is why we have appellate courts.
But at critical junctures in our history, ordinary citizens,
protected by evenhanded judges, have made extraordinary
decisions that shaped what we became as a society of laws. In
New York in 1734, when a Grand Jury refused to indict John
Peter Zenger for libel but the Attorney General charged him
anyway, a petit jury acquitted him, and two classic American
principles were enshrined before we even had a national con-
stitution: freedom of the press and truth as a defense. Nearly
three centuries later in California in November 2017, when a
jury found Jose Ines Garcia Zarate guilty of felonious posses-
sion of a firearm but not guilty of the heartbreaking murder of
Kate Steinle, another anonymous group of average citizens
demonstrated what the rule of law looks like. Despite the mas-
sive attention drawn to the case because the defendant was a
repeat illegal entrant into the United States, a jury of average
citizens upheld the proposition that a defendant may only be
convicted if the proof is properly presented and beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, and that even the xenophobic public pro-
nouncements of politicians must not lead jurors to where the
evidence does not go.12
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Before there was a code of judicial conduct, it was not nec-
essarily uncommon for judges to engage in activities that com-
promised or appeared to compromise their judicial indepen-
dence. Indeed, the 1924 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics was
adopted in significant measure because Kennesaw Mountain
Landis, the first commissioner of major league baseball who
was also a federal judge, refused to quit the bench and insisted
on performing both jobs contemporaneously.13 Although Lan-
dis eventually relinquished his judgeship, without meaningful
enforcement mechanisms in either the federal or state court
systems, the 1924 Canons were largely hortatory, and compli-
ance was voluntary.
Beginning with California in 1960, all 50 states moved to
fill the vacuum between judi-
cial independence and account-
ability with judicial ethics
enforcement commissions.14
Moreover, every state has
adapted the ABA Model Code,
most recently revised in 2007,
whose preamble describes it as
“rules of reason” intended as
both a guide to ethical behavior
and a basis for imposing sanc-
tions.15 At the federal level, and even in states that have
adopted codes and means of enforcement for executive and
legislative branch officials, judges are bound to a more strin-
gent set of promulgated standards of conduct than any other
public officers. And few are as energetically enforced. In 
2018, for example, 136 judges were publicly disciplined in 34
states, including 29 in Texas, 19 in New York and eight each
in California and Washington.16
While the concept of an independent judiciary came well
before public insistence on an accountable one, it would be
wrong to conclude that the latter is a brake on the former.
Contrary to what may be a common complaint among judges,
judicial conduct commissions, far from inhibiting judicial
independence, actually and critically protect it. Recognizing
that judicial commissions are here to stay, in 1994 the ABA also
adopted Model Rules of Judicial Disciplinary Enforcement,
inter alia to help ethics professionals avoid crossing the line
between independence and accountability.17
A judicial conduct commission is not an appellate court. It
can neither remand nor remit a case, nor overrule a court-adju-
dicated finding of fact or conclusion of law. Nor in most states
does the commission have administrative authority over the
courts, so it cannot transfer cases from one judge to another,
nor reassign a judge to a different term of court or part of the
state. Typically, it can only investigate and, where appropriate,
discipline a judge for violating the Code. Even where the com-
mission determines that a judge was unethically motivated to
decide a case a certain way and should be removed from
office—say, a close relative of the judge was a party or lawyer
in the matter, or the judge had a substantial undisclosed inter-
est that was affected by the outcome—the determination may
only discipline the judge; it has no effect on the court case
itself. An aggrieved party would have to seek redress through
the courts themselves to mitigate or undo the disciplined
judge’s mal-motivated decision.
Whether by confidential caution, public reprimand or
removal from office, the commission holds the judiciary to
account for ethical transgressions and plays an important role
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in protecting the public from
unfit incumbents.18 Many also
have authority to retire a judge
for physical or mental disability.19
Of course, however justified,
even the mildest discipline will
sting the affected judge. It may,
therefore, be natural for judges to
view judicial commissions with suspicion, as a scold or even as
an inhibitor rather than protector of judicial independence.
But they would be wrong.
Examining the record of the New York State Commission
on Judicial Conduct, statistically the most active in the coun-
try since its creation in 1978, makes the point.
There are over 1,400 courts throughout New York, and
approximately 3,300 judges. Since 1978, the commission has
issued over 850 public disciplinary decisions including 172
removals from office.20 But these startling numbers do not tell
the entire story. For in addition to the disciplines it imposes,
the commission absorbs a great deal of public and personalized
criticism that would ordinarily be directed to the judiciary.
Those 850 disciplines comprise a mere 1.5% of the more than
58,000 complaints received, processed, analyzed, and mostly
rejected over that same time frame. In other words, 98.5% of
the time, the commission tells a complainant that there was no
ethical wrongdoing, and it explains why.21 Nearly half of those
complaints were limited to expressions of dissatisfaction with
the court’s decision, and not one of those was investigated.22
In receiving, considering, dismissing, and explaining its rea-
sons for declining to investigate such complaints, the commis-
sion deflects and takes upon itself the anger of litigants that
would otherwise be aimed at the courts. Moreover, in a public
annual report, it not only elucidates the behavior that did result
in discipline but also demonstrates with statistical evidence
that it shields judges from unfair attack.23 As such, the com-
mission helps to protect the judge’s freedom and responsibility
to rule on the merits.
The New York experience is representative. In virtually all
jurisdictions, the statistical record is the same. The vast major-
ity of complaints are dismissed as without merit.24
The recent firestorm of controversy in California regarding
the so-called “Stanford rape case” is a prime example of how a
disciplinary commission may actually protect the indepen-
dence of the judiciary. It is also a lesson in the perils of allow-
ing a superseding process to negate that protection.
Whatever one’s view of the merits of Judge Aaron Persky’s
sentencing of former Stanford University swimmer Brock
Turner for the sexual assault of an unconscious “Emily Doe”—
three months in jail, plus three years’ probation and registra-
tion as a sex offender—it was the California Commission on
Judicial Performance that initially answered the public outcry
from those who considered the sentence lenient. The Califor-
nia commission examined and found that the sentence was
lawful and within the judge’s discretion, that he had not been
motivated by such misconduct as bias based on gender, race,
or socioeconomic status, and that he was not insensitive to the
seriousness of sexual assault.25 That should have been the last
word, but it was not. The California commission was subjected
to fierce political criticism for exonerating Judge Persky of mis-
conduct,26 and the state auditor initiated an investigation of
the commission itself.27
As for Judge Persky, being cleared of misconduct by the
commission did not save him from California’s recall provi-
sion, through which he was ousted from office by majority
vote.28 In a spectacular irony, a judge who was ethically bound
“not [to] be swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism”29 was
removed from the bench as a result of both. Mindful of the
warnings over 225 years ago, not only by Alexander Hamilton
about tampering with judicial independence but also by James
Madison about the “impulse of passion” that may perniciously
factionalize the body politic,30 one might ask: What is more
likely to chill the independent rendering of judicial decisions:
the removal of a judge for ethical misconduct by a disciplinary
commission after a due-process proceeding, or the recall of a
judge by an electorate unhappy with a single decision?
The California commission’s experience in Persky is not
singular.
In 1997, in Matter of Duckman, a case that generated world-
wide attention, the New York commission threaded the needle
between acts of misconduct and judicial discretion.31 Duck-
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man, a New York City Criminal Court Judge, had reduced the
bail on a defendant from $5,000 (which he couldn’t make) to
$2,000 (which he could). The defendant promptly went out
and killed both his girlfriend and himself. The political and
tabloid outcry against Judge Duckman was unprecedented.
The then-governor, mayor and state Senate majority leader,
among many others, called for his removal.32 The tabloid
focus on Duckman brought to light numerous other problem-
atic acts in his judicial record, and the commission deter-
mined to remove him from office for inter alia repeatedly mak-
ing statements that were gender and race insensitive, and for
deliberately dismissing accusatory instruments as facially
insufficient when he knew they were not, because he did not
believe the lower-level crimes at issue should be prosecuted.
But as to the matter for which the governor and others wanted
him removed—the bail reduction that led to murder—the
commission dismissed the charge, having determined that it
was a lawful ruling within the judge’s discretion, and that it
had not been tainted by prejudice or other misconduct.
Promptly thereafter, the evidently displeased governor recom-
mended a cut in the commission’s budget, which was later
restored by the legislature.
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS
As effective as the states have been in enforcing judicial
ethics, the federal judiciary has lagged far behind. To be sure,
there is a Code of Conduct for United States Judges, based on
the same ABA Model Code the states have all adapted and
adopted.33 But there is no office or dedicated professional
staff to enforce it. The federal judiciary has retained the
exclusive authority to police itself—the failure of which in
the states led to the evolution of independent ethics-enforc-
ing commissions.
It is exceedingly rare for a federal judge to be disciplined. In
2016, for example, 1,303 complaints were filed with the fed-
eral circuits, but only four were investigated.34 In the past
decade fewer than one federal judge per year has been disci-
plined.35 In the history of the United States, only 15 federal
judges have been impeached; eight were convicted, three
resigned, four were acquitted. Two who had been convicted of
crimes—Harry Claiborne of Nevada and Walter Nixon of Mis-
sissippi—refused to quit, went to jail and drew their judicial
salaries until Congress impeached
and removed them from office.36
These shortcomings were most
recently illustrated by the failure
of the federal judicial disciplinary
“system” to complete ethics
inquiries into important com-
plaints because the judges at issue
suddenly resigned—e.g., former
Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex
Kozinski, who was accused of sexual harassment,37 or Third
Circuit Associate Judge Maryanne Trump Barry, who was
accused of financial fraud38—or failed even to undertake an
investigation because the judge, Brett Kavanaugh, was elevated
to the Supreme Court, which does not apply the Code of Judi-
cial Conduct to itself.39
Such high-profile failures and generally low investigative
numbers inevitably suggest that the federal bench, which is
probably no more or less ethically challenged than the typical
state bench, is self-protective. Indeed, a committee chaired by
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer commented in a 2006
report that a system in which judges judge one another is at
risk of undue favoritism.40
Public confidence in the federal courts could be improved
by the creation of an independent judicial monitor to collect
complaints, investigate those with merit, and initiate proceed-
ings before a disciplinary panel of judges designated by the
chief justice for lesser, i.e. non-removable offenses. In egre-
gious cases, the independent monitor could recommend pro-
ceedings to the House of Representatives, since the only means
by which a federal judge may be removed is impeachment by
the House and conviction by the Senate.41
The languid federal ethics enforcement record has been
addressed more than once by the Supreme Court, the United
States Judicial Conference, and the United States Senate, but
meaningful, comprehensive reform has remained elusive. The
Breyer committee in 2006 recommended a uniform procedure
throughout all the federal circuits for dealing with complaints
against judges, but it did not recommend a centralized staff or
process. There is no staff specifically trained and dedicated to
adjudicating let alone rooting out misconduct among judges
systemwide. There is no equivalent to the ABA Model Rules of
Judicial Disciplinary Enforcement.
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The Executive Committee of
the United States Judicial Confer-
ence, chaired by Judge Merrick
Garland of the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals, recently reexamined
the federal court ethics enforce-
ment system, but in its March
2019 report it, too, chose to keep
judges firmly in charge of their
own discipline.42 This will not
likely inspire public confidence
or result in more sanctions than what has become the minimal
norm. While the federal courts did take a step forward by cre-
ating a Judicial Integrity Office in December 2018 that became
operative in April 2019, its mandate is limited to “workplace
conduct matters” for court employees.43 The broad range of
ethical matters addressed in the judicial code of conduct,
applicable to judges, are apparently not within the purview of
the new judicial integrity officer.44
More than once since 2006, Congress has entertained pro-
posals to strengthen the system by creating an “Inspector
General for the Judicial Branch,” to be appointed by the chief
justice on consultation with congressional leaders.45 Among
other things, the inspector general would investigate possible
misconduct by judges, as well as conduct audits and pursue
inquiries as to non-judicial employees to prevent and detect
waste, fraud, and abuse. It would report to the Chief Justice
and to the Congress on matters that may require action by
either, which could result in the reprimand of a judge by the
courts or the impeachment and removal of a judge by the
House and Senate.46 While such legislation has never
advanced beyond committee, the less effectually the courts
appear to deal with the next string of notorious Kozinski-
Kavanaugh-Barry type issues, the more likely Congress will be
to act, for better or worse. Having a system legislatively
imposed on the courts could be avoided by crafting a mean-
ingful one on their own.
Would it be too much to expect, in a cynical and dizzying
political era, for our federal judiciary to demonstrate how to
accept responsibility and promote accountability in contrast to
political actors that often try to avoid both? Might an invigo-
rated national system of judicial ethics enforcement show, as
state government entities have long demonstrated, that officers
of at least one branch of government are held to the highest
standards of conduct, with measurable and measured conse-
quences when, on occasion, they fail to meet those standards?
Doing so would considerably enhance public confidence in
what always must remain the “firmest pillar” of our constitu-
tional republic.
BUILDING AND MAINTAINING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN
THE COURTS
Judges and ethics enforcers have important roles to play in
protecting the independence of the courts and the public’s
confidence in it. At times that may mean acting contrary to
popular opinion. It may mean restraint when action would be
so much easier and more politically expedient. It may require
engaging in some public education, as the California commis-
sion did in the Persky matter, and the New York commission
did in Duckman. Yet the greatest risk to judicial independence
is one that a judicial ethics enforcement entity has no power
to combat.
In an age when normative public standards and constitu-
tional institutions routinely come under attack, in some
instances by the very people who are sworn to preserve, pro-
tect and defend them, the judiciary must not become just
another casualty of partisan politics or culture wars. Yet a
judicial ethics commission has no authority over a president
who seems blithely to criticize judicial decisions as “a dis-
grace” simply because he disagrees with them,47 nor over a
Congress that seems to spiral ever downward toward an acri-
monious partisan abyss.
Perhaps nowhere is the threat to an independent judiciary
more evident than the rancorous manner in which we elect or
appoint judicial officers. As the US Supreme Court case of
Caperton v. Massey Coal and the blood sport of federal judi-
cial nominations all too vividly reveal, special interest groups
now commit unseemly amounts of money to affect judicial
elections and nominations. In Caperton, millions of coal
industry dollars were spent to elect a West Virginia Supreme
Court Justice who then cast the tie-breaking vote in a case
favoring the coal industry. The US Supreme Court found the
compromise to independence and impartiality so great as to
invalidate the decision.48
Yet seven years before Caperton, in Republican Party of Min-
nesota v. White, the Supreme Court had released judicial candi-
dates from rules that prohibited unfettered comment on polit-
ical issues in the course of their campaigns.49 Short of making
a pledge, promise, or commitment with respect to cases, con-
troversies, or issues likely to come before the court, judicial
candidates were freed to say just about anything that circum-
spect judges had previously avoided.
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A related Code provision, the “disqualification rule,”
requires a judge to recuse in any case where his or her impar-
tiality might reasonably be questioned, including where the
judge, while a candidate, made a public statement that com-
mits, or appears to commit, the judge with respect to an issue
in the proceeding, the controversy itself and, in some jurisdic-
tions, the parties or a class of parties.50 In his concurring opin-
ion in White, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that the states
may adopt disqualification standards more rigorous than due
process requires and may discipline judges who violate those
standards.51 Yet despite reasonable and constitutionally valid
restrictions on judicial campaign conduct, Caperton demon-
strates the extreme partisanship into which formerly staid judi-
cial campaigns may descend.
Do we really want a judiciary that is elected in the same way
as legislators and executives, picking up special-interest
endorsements, hustling for votes? What would be the judicial
equivalent of a pledge to “bring home the bacon”—a figurative
wink to landlords while addressing a real-estate group, or to
renters while addressing a tenants’ association? Do we want to
create the impression, and even worse, the reality, of judges
beholden to voting blocs? Will we so taint the judiciary by the
manner in which we elect them that they cannot be or appear
impartial once they get to the bench?
Ultimately, the burden to sort through these conundrums
falls on judicial ethics enforcers. For example, under White a
judicial candidate may permissively say, “I have always
believed life begins at conception,” but not say, “If an abortion
case comes before me, I will rule in favor of the unborn child.”
The latter would likely result in discipline under the “pledges
or promises” clause. It would also likely trigger disqualifica-
tion from an abortion-rights case because the candidate would
have made a statement that did or appeared to commit to a
party or a particular result. Substitute “pro-choice” for “right-
to-life” in this example, and the ultimate result would be the
same. (How ironic that publicly declaring one’s allegiance on
an issue, to gain the vote of its adherents, would end up dis-
qualifying the candidate, once elected, from hearing cases on
that very issue.)
Other campaign statements may not violate the rules so
clearly. If a candidate were to say, “I have long been pro-choice
[or right-to-life], and on the bench, I will always try to do the
right thing,” a disciplinary enforcer would have to weigh
whether this was a disguised and prohibited issue-related
“pledge” or “promise,” and whether imposing discipline for it
would promote or erode judicial independence. This would
not be an easy call, and the result might well trigger a First
Amendment appeal akin to White, with unpredictable and
unintended consequences.
Electoral campaigns are not the only place in which judicial
aspirants are subjected to partisan pounding. In United States
Senate confirmations, passionate liberal or conservative
activists mobilize their bases: pro-choice and right-to-life
groups, pro-business and pro-consumer associations, pro-gun
and gun-control lobbyists, law-and-order advocates and civil
libertarians, and countless others. Rarely in these debates,
except from well-schooled nominees who deflect specific
issue-related questions, do we hear any passion for the idea
that a judge should rule with integrity on the facts and law
without injecting personal beliefs into the equation. Yet that is
the ultimate ideal. A judge who believes in either pro-choice or
right-to-life should still be able to decide whether there was
trespass at an abortion clinic, on the facts, without ideology. 
The increasingly divisive, special-interest, and politically
driven view of the judiciary cannot be what we want for our
system of justice. But, like the electoral recall of Judge Persky
in California, it poses a far greater threat to judicial indepen-
dence and the rule of law than any judicial disciplinary com-
mission ever did. This trend toward factionalizing the judi-
ciary, which brings with it the potential to eviscerate the most
distinguishing, liberty-saving feature of our constitutional gov-
ernance, must be resisted. It cannot be said forcefully enough
that there is a compelling, even overriding state interest in the
independence, impartiality, and integrity of the judiciary. We
play with it, and fail to protect it, at our great national peril.
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